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A. Wayne MacKay* Framing the Issues for Cameras
in the Courtrooms: Redefining
Judicial Dignity and Decorum
This article examines the role of s. 2(b) of the Charter of Rights in determining the
role of cameras in Canadian courtrooms. The discussions reveal that arguments
in opposition to cameras are largely unfounded and in contradiction to the
freedom of expression guarantee. The denial of the right is in reality based on
judges' and lawyers' fear of loss of control of the courtroom environment.
Cameras should only be banned from courtrooms as part of a total publication
ban, and then only after a careful s. 1 analysis.
Cet article examine le role de 'al. 2(b) de la Charte canadienne des droits et
libert6s dans la d6termination du r6le des cameras dans les salles d'audience des
tribunaux canadiens. Les propos de I'auteur r6v~lent que les arguments contre
/a pr6sence des cam6ras sont plus ou moins fond6s et contreviennent a la libert6
d'expression garantie par la Charte. En r6alit6, le refus de la pr6sence des
cam6ras est bas6 sur un sentiment d'appr6hension de la part des juges et des
avocats de perdre le contr6le des salles de tribunaux. La pr6sence des cam6ras
devrait 6tre interdite uniquement dans le cadre des audiences tenues 6 huis clos,
et ce, seulement aprbs avoir proc6d6 a une analyse rigoureuse de la situation,
1 la lumiere des critbres de 'art. 1. de la Charte.
Introduction
The question of whether or not to allow cameras in Canadian courtrooms
has bedevilled the judicial system for some time. It is an issue upon which
almost everyone has an opinion, be they judges, lawyers or members of
the general public. Furthermore, opinions on this topic tend to be strongly
held ones, especially among those who oppose the invasion of the
electronic media into the inner sancta of the judicial system. There is
assumed to be a conflict between the delivery of dispassionate justice
with proper decorum and public access to courts through the eyes of the
camera. An essential component of this article is the challenge to the
presumed conflict between the dispensing ofjustice and camera coverage
of court proceedings.
* Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, and Executive Director of the Nova Scotia Human
Rights Commission. The author would like to acknowledge the excellent research assistance
and editing of Pamela Rubin, a Halifax lawyer and environmental activist, for assistance with
an earlier draft of this article, originally presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Bar
Association in Toronto on August 23-24, 1994. The article has been updated and substantially
revised since the original presentation.
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Freedom of expression in Canada is recognized as one of the funda-
mental freedoms in a free and democratic society and is guaranteed in
s. 2(b) of the Charter,' as follows:
2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including
freedom of the press and other media of communication.
It should be noted that in the above formulation freedom of the press is
included as one aspect of freedom of expression, and throughout this
paper I shall refer to the larger concept of freedom of expression. While
judges have generally been generous in interpreting the meaning of
freedom of expression, the strength of that stance is often sorely put to the
test when decisions must be made concerning electronic media in the
legal sanctum of the courtroom.
Much of the debate among lawyers and judges regarding cameras in
the courtroom has centred around the question "shall we or shall we not"
allow such a thing. In this way, the legal profession has tended to view
camera access as a privilege, and not as part of the rights guaranteed by
s. 2(b) of the Charter. By framing the debate this way, a number of the
conservative tendencies of the legal community are allowed to come into
play. These include:
- regarding the courtroom as an exclusive judicial fiefdom;
- seeing lawyers and judges as the final arbiters and last protectors of
dignity;
- viewing constitutional rights for the accused as automatically pre-
emptive of other Charter rights;
- perpetuating a class bias against the electronic media and those who
primarily receive their information through television; and
- questioning the integrity and ability of judges and lawyers them-
selves to handle publicity.
I would suggest that simply asking "shall we or shall we not" is not the
appropriate way to tackle this issue. Instead, decisions should be explor-
ing the meaning of freedom of expression, which is a fundamental
freedom in this society and one that is now enshrined in the Charter.
Access, as part of a constitutionally guaranteed right, should not exist
simply at the discretion of the legal community. To the extent that a right
of access is an essential part of this freedom, access of the electronic
media to courtrooms is mandated. Once a right of access is seen as part
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
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of freedom of expression, the legal community's task is one of balancing
the right of access with other rights enjoyed in our society.
This article will explore three areas:
1) the jurisprudence regarding electronic media and courtrooms as part
of a larger freedom of expression framework;
2) the appropriate test for use under s. 1 of the Charter when this right
must be balanced with others, and some of the empirical evidence
likely to be used in this regard in the future (This discussion will be
restricted to the balancing of freedom of expression rights and fair
trial rights, and will not consider in any detail the balancing of
freedom of expression with any right to privacy.); and
3) what are perhaps the actual reasons behind the hesitation of the
profession to admit cameras to courtrooms even when cameras' lack
of impact on trial fairness is known to decision makers.
This article will not undertake to explore statutory publication bans and
their application to the electronic media, which is a large issue unto itself.
I. Electronic Media and Recent Freedom of
Expression Jurisprudence
The full scope of freedom of expression under s. 2(b) remains to be
defined. Several years ago, one controversial issue was whether s.2(b)
included a right of access at all. However, given some recent decisions,
it is reasonable to expect that courts will now recognize access as part of
s. 2(b). Some of these cases are discussed below. One important unre-
solved area is the extent to which s. 2(b) includes a right of access to
courtrooms by the media-in particular the electronic media-and
others. I would argue that s. 2(b) indeed includes such a right and that the
task ahead for the Canadian judiciary is to decide how such a right of
access interrelates with other rights and values in this society, and in
particular other Charter rights. There is also the question of why the
electronic media are treated differently from other branches of the free
press.
1. Electronic Access to Courtrooms and s. 2(b)
Whether a right of access is an essential part of s. 2(b) has been examined
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Committee for the Commonwealth of
Canada v. Canada.2 While this case makes it clear that some right of
2. [19911 1 S.C.R. 139.
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access is part of s. 2(b), the Court was very divided in its analytical
approach: seven justices sat on the case and there were six different
analyses. In March of 1984 two men went to Dorval Airport in Montreal
to promote knowledge of their group by handing out pamphlets and
magazines. An RCMP officer requested they cease their activities. They
were then informed by the assistant airport manager that their activities
were prohibited by the Government Airport Concession Operation
Regulations,3 which prohibited any solicitation or advertising in the
airport. The men brought an action in the Federal Court, seeking an order
that, inter alia, their right to freedom of expression had been violated. The
trial judge agreed. The Federal Court of Appeal, in a 2-1 decision,
dismissed the appeal.4 However, the Court did not rule on whether
airports constituted a public forum for the purposes of freedom of
expression under the Charter.
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed an appeal from the Federal
Court of Appeal's decision. Justices Lamer and Sopinka held that
ownership by the government cannot of itself authorize an infringement
of the freedom guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Charter. When a person
claims that freedom of expression has been infringed in a place owned by
the government, the interests at issue must be examined. An individual
will only be free to communicate in such a place if the form of expression
used is compatible with the principal function or intended purpose of the
place and does not have the effect of depriving citizens, as a whole, of the
effective operation of government services. If the expression contravenes
the function of the place, such expression is not covered under s. 2(b).
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 preferred to limit such qualifications to the
analysis under s. 1. She cited the necessity in interpreting such a funda-
mental freedom as freedom of expression of using a large and liberal
approach to defining the scope of s. 2(b). Further, applying the test from
Irwin Toy5 she states:
If the activity falls within the protected sphere of conduct, the second step
in the analysis is to determine whether the purpose or effect of the
government action in issue was to restrict freedom of expression. If the
government has aimed to control attempts to convey a meaning either by
directly restricting the content of expression or by restricting a form of
expression tied to content, its purpose trenches on the guarantee.6
3. SORF/79-373, s. 7(a), (b).
4. [1987] 2 F.C. 68.
5. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney-General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.
6. Supra note 2 at 187.
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"Restricting a form of expression tied to content" would seem to apply to
the situation of excluding the electronic media from courtrooms, thus
producing an infringement of s. 2(b).
But L'Heureux-Dub6 J. also refused to consider arguments surround-
ing the rights of the media or more general issues of access to public
property:
For our present purposes, it is only necessary to consider the Charter's
impact on the distribution of leaflets on governmentproperty. The Charter's
effect on leafletting on private property, as well as whether it gives the
media a right of access to public property for the purpose of gathering
news, are better left for another day. It would be inappropriate to address
these issues here .... 7
The effect of Committee for the Commonwealth was summarized in
simple terms by Justice Krever in his majority judgment in Ramsden v.
Peterborough (City):
I read Committee ... as holding that, although s. 2(b) does not confer a
right to use all government property for expressive purposes, prohibiting
expression at, in or on all public property does offend s. 2(b). It is also
authority for the proposition that the government's stewardship or even
ownership of public property does not entitle the government to prohibit
absolutely access to all public property for the purpose of communicating
information.'
An approach to limiting s. 2(b) has been adopted which involves
looking at the principal purposes of a government-owned place, and
deciding whether or not the expression is compatible with that purpose.
For example, protesting in the middle of the highway is given as an
example of unprotected expression.
The compatible-with-principal-purpose test is an interesting one when
applied to cameras in the courtroom. What are the purposes and functions
of a courtroom? One of those purposes is to provide a forum for the public
surveillance and discussion of the judicial process. This purpose is quite
different from purposes such as landing airplanes, testing weapons, or
docking ships. When one of the very purposes of a government-owned
place is to provide an avenue for freedom of expression, I would suggest
it becomes difficult if not impossible to limit the rights of electronic
media establishments at the s. 2(b) stage, under a compatible-with-the-
principal-purpose test.
In the earliest case considering the electronic media and the scope of
s. 2(b) as it applies to the courtroom, freedom of the press was limited
7. Ibid. at 197 [emphasis in original].
8. (1991), 5 O.R. (3d) 289; aff'd [1993] 2 S.C.R. 1084 at 292 [emphasis in original].
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simply to a right to attend and report generally. In 1983 in R. v. Thomson
Newspapers,9 Anderson J. of the Ontario High Court refused to allow the
filming of documentary evidence. This would have required court staff
to produce documents a second time for inspection, and the court held that
there is no requirement under s. 2(b) for the court to make evidence
available to certain reporters in a certain way. This approach is consistent
with rulings that the media's right to courtroom access is no greater than
the general public's.1° Under this approach, there is no obligation to make
evidence available in a way that suits broadcast needs.11
The filming of documentary evidence is usually of less concern to the
media than the filming of actual proceedings and of the parties involved.
Section 2(b) in the context of the filming of witnesses and the accused was
not considered until the case of R. v. Squires.12 On this issue the ultimate
deciding court in Squires is all over the map on the proper way to analyze
the problems, with the Ontario Court of Appeal offering three rather
different opinions and one dissent. This case dealt with s. 67 of the
Judicature Act,'3 which made it an offence to direct the filming of a person
9. (1983), 11 W.C.B. 436 (Ont. H.C.).
10. See Re Southam Inc. andR (No.1)(1983), 3 C.C.C. (3d) 515 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. R.(T.)
(No.]) (1984), 7 D.L.R. (4th) 205 (Alta. Q.B.); but also R. v. Lortie (1985), 21 C.C.C. (3d) 436
(Que. C.A.), where a majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal denied certain media organiza-
tions access to videotape evidence showing the accused allegedly committing the acts of which
he was accused. Significantly, in light of her appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada, then
Court of Appeal Justice L'Heureux-Dub held in dissent that the media did indeed have a right
to access the video footage, as part of their general s. 2(b) rights.
11. One might make the case that the electronic media are in the same position as a disabled
member of the public vis-d-vis inspecting documents. To the extent that accommodations
might be made for a blind person, for example, one might argue that evidence must be presented
in a way that is useful to electronic media establishments. This, however, is approaching an
analogy between the electronic media and groups protected from discrimination under the
Charter, which is no longer a legal possibility given the Supreme Court's current definition of
the types of groups which are analogous to those explicitly protected. (See Andrews v. Law
Society of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143; R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296.)
12. (1986), 25 C.C.C. (3d) 44 (Ont. Prov. Ct.), aff'd (1989), 69 C.R. (3d) 337 (Ont. Dist. Ct.);
(1992), 11 O.R. (3d) 385 (C.A.); leave to appeal refused, [1993] 3 S.C.R. ix.
13. R.S.O. 1980, c. 223. This section (now superseded by the similar s. 146 of the Courts of
Justice Act, S.O. 1984, c. 11) provides that:
67.(1) In this section,
(a) "judge" means the person residing at a judicial proceeding;
(b) "judicial proceeding" means the space enclosed by the walls of the building.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), no person shall,
(a) take or attempt to take any photograph, motion picture or other record capable
of producing visual representations by electronic means or otherwise.
(i) at a judicial proceeding, or
(ii) of any person entering or leaving the room in which thejudicial proceeding
is to be or has been convened, or
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entering or leaving a courtroom (as well as filming within courtrooms).
The defendant, a television reporter, was charged under this section and
in a pre-trial motion argued that s. 67 was inconsistent with s. 2(b) of the
Charter.
In the Ontario Provincial Court, the trial judge rejected this argument,
and found the defendant guilty. On appeal to the District Court, Justice
Mercier found that s. 2(b) of the Charter was contravened by s. 67 of the
Judicature Act. He held, contrary to the trial judge, that s. 2(b) of the
Charter conferred a right to televise or photograph judicial proceedings
in court:
To say that you cannot be limited in the dissemination of information...
but that you can be limited in gathering the information you wish to
disseminate, or at least in the manner of gathering that information ...
renders that right meaningless. 4
This is a significant affirmation of the electronic media's s. 2(b) rights in
real world terms. However, this right did not fare well under Justice
Mercier's approach to balancing rights under s. 1 of the Charter. He
found that the provisions of s. 67, with the exception of s. 67(3)(c), were
saved by s. 1.
[T]he guaranteed right to a fair trial is paramount to the fundamental
freedom of the press and other media of communication, certainly within
the confines of a court and probably anywhere. This paramount right,
therefore, justifies some limitation of any other freedom which might
affect it negatively. The government objective to ensure fair trials is of
sufficient importance to warrant overriding the constitutionally protected
freedom of the press and other media of communication if it established
that it can interfere with that objective....
The evidence does establish that televising judicial proceedings can
and does interfere with fair trials. 5
(iii) of any person in the precincts of the building in which the judicial
proceeding is to be or has been convened where there is reasonable ground
for believing that such person is there for the purpose of attending or
leaving the proceeding; or
(b) publish, broadcast, reproduce or otherwise disseminate any photograph, motion
picture or record taken or made in contravention of clause (a).
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply to any photograph, motion picture or record taken or
made upon authorization of the judge,
(a) where required for the presentation of evidence or the making of a record or for
any other purpose of the judicial proceeding;
(b) in connection with any investive, ceremonial, naturalization or similar proceed-
ings; or
(c) with the consent of the parties and witnesses, for such educational or instruc-
tional purposes as may be approved by the judge.
(4) Every person who is in contravention of this section is guilty of an offence ....
14. Supra note 12 at 347-48.
15. Ibid. at 352-53.
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Justice Mercier is demonstrating the pre-eminent concern of many
judges for a fair trial and the rights of the accused in the criminal process.
The effect of his decision was that s. 67 remained in force, with a revised
subsection 3,16 allowing a judge to permit filming if the parties and
witnesses agree to the procedure for any purpose, not only for educational
or institutional activities.
The subsequent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal was not as
helpful as one might have hoped. At the outset the court limited the scope
of the appeal to s. 67(2)(a)(ii), and refused to consider the entire section
as the courts below had done. Thus, any discussion regarding cameras in
the courtroom proper was effectively curtailed, shedding no new light on
actual courtroom access. The Court dealt only with filming a person
entering or leaving a courtroom. This is a relatively narrow issue, and
there were a variety of opinions: three majority opinions and one in
dissent.
In dismissing the appeal, the Court held that s. 67(2)(a)(ii) did indeed
infringe s. 2(b) of the Charter, as the freedom of expression enjoyed by
television journalists is the freedom to film events as they occur and
broadcast them to the public. The court held s. 67(2)(a)(ii) restricted this
freedom. In his dissenting judgment, Tarnopolsky, J.A. alluded to his
impressions of televising trials:
Without commenting upon the desirability of televising trials, since that
issue is not before us, I would agree that a certain amount is lost to
journalists and the public because of the limits imposed by s. 67(2) of the
Judicature Act. An artist's rendering can never capture the vital and
spontaneous depiction offered by televised images....
There is ample evidence in this case to suggest that television journal-
ism, perhaps the most widely resorted to medium of journalism today, is
handicapped in the coverage it can convey ofjudicial proceedings, thereby
precluding any meaningful realization of its potential in informing the
public and of its s. 2(b) right. 7
As at the previous level, however, it was also found that such restrictions
were a reasonable limit under s. 1 of the Charter.
In applying the second part of the OakesII test, there was held to be a
rational connection between the restrictions in s. 67(2)(a)(ii) and the
objective of the legislation-preserving a calm and dignified atmosphere
16. Of course, the right to a fair trial and the right of media access are not always at cross
purposes, as evidenced by the request for media access by Paul Bernado's lawyer in Canada's
own sensational Homolka trial. This view has now been affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Dagenais, discussed below at note 34.
17. Supra note 12, (1992), I O.R. (3d) 385 (C.A.) at 405.
18. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
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for the administration of justice. While refusing to address the issue of
cameras in the courtroom specifically, and speaking in dicta, Houlden,
J.A. discussed the atmosphere of a courtroom:
A courthouse is not a place of entertainment or education; it is a place
where people come to obtain a just resolution of their disputes....
The other objective of the legislation ... was the protection of privacy
of the participants involved....
[These] two objectives, I have accepted, are of sufficient importance,
in my judgment, to justify overriding the freedom conferred on the
appellant by s. 2(b) of the Charter.9
Leave to appeal this decision to the Supreme Court of Canada was
refused.
2. Inclusion Within s. 2(b): The Close Connection Between Freedom
of Expression and Electronic Access to Courtrooms
Section 1 is the appropriate place for balancing in the case of cameras in
the courtroom. Applying s. 2(b) liberally renders unlikely the exclusion
from its scope of camera access to courtrooms. In this context the
balancing of other rights and interests is best done using the detailed
framework set out in s. 1, rather than unnecessarily narrowing s. 2(b).
I have argued elsewhere that certain types of speech should be
excluded from the scope of s. 2(b) to save the effort of going through a s. 1
balancing every time the government regulates speech. 20 These areas
would include hate literature and degrading obscenity. In those cases the
impact of equality rights in the Charter should be to remove from the
scope of s. 2(b) types of speech that are damaging to vulnerable groups
to the extent that it treats them unequally.
The case of cameras in the courtroom is very different from those
examples. The right of access for the electronic media is an integral part
of freedom of the press that is protected under s. 2(b). It is notjust another
"type" of expression based on content. Access as part of freedom of the
press is crucial to the manifestation of freedom of expression in Canadian
society. Therefore it is appropriate to limit media access using the more
demanding technique of proving an exception under s. 1 of the Charter.
19. Supra note 12 at 393.
20. I refer to this "mutual modification" of equality rights and freedom of expression in the
forthcoming article "Regulating Freedom of Expression the Canadian Way" published as part
of the proceedings of "Continuing Constitutional Dilemmas" held by the Queen's University
Institute of Intergovernmental Affairs in 1994. The idea is that freedom of expression can be
"read down" to take account of the Charter guarantees of equality. Presumably the process
could also work in reverse-restricting equality to take account of the guarantee of freedom
of expression.
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Not everyone agrees that access to courtrooms by electronic media
should be considered a s. 2(b) Charter right. David Lepofsky explores
what he describes as serious threats to the proper administration ofjustice
posed by cameras in the courts and confronts the arguments in favour of
access for the electronic media advanced by advocates of freedom of the
press. 2' Lepofsky argues that the principle of openjustice does not require
camera access to courts. Indeed, he concludes that cameras should only
be allowed into courtrooms with the consent of the parties. More
pertinently here, Lepofsky maintains that camera access to the court-
rooms is not a part of the guarantee of freedom of expression in s. 2(b) of
the Charter. This conclusion leaves the matter of camera access to courts
as a mere policy debate unburdened by the rigours of constitutional
analysis. In essence Lepofsky argues that because cameras have tradi-
tionally not been allowed in courtrooms, there is no constitutional right
of access as part of freedom of the press.
Constitutional rights tend to include those entitlements that we consider
fundamental to our democracy. They are comprised of entitlements that
are tried and true.21
This analysis comes dangerously close to constitutionalizing the status
quo rather than recognizing the value of the Charter as a vehicle for
change. Freedom of the press is fundamental to our democracy and this
in our modem technological age includes the electronic media. Just
because certain claims take a new form and make some uncomfortable
does not mean they are any less deserving of constitutional protection.
Inequality has long been practiced in Canada and from the perspective of
some is tried and true. Surely that does not mean that more novel concepts
of equality (albeit not tried and true) cannot be guaranteed by s. 15 of the
Charter. I reject Lepofsky's constitutional analysis as too backward
looking, and advocate a more transformative role for the Charter in
Canadian society.
The connection between freedom of expression and access to the
courts can be seen in the Supreme Court of Canada's confirmation of the
Ontario High Court's decision in the Edmonton Journal case.23 Section
30 of the Alberta Judicature Act 24 prohibited, inter alia, the publication
of any details relating to matrimonial proceedings other than the names,
addresses and occupations of the parties and witnesses; a concise statement
21. M. David Lepofsky, "Cameras in the Courtroom-Not Without My Consent" (1996) 6
Nat. J. Const. Law 161.
22. Ibid. at 218-19.
23. Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326.
24. Supra note 13.
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of the charges, defences, counter-charges and legal submissions; and the
summing up of the judge. The Edmonton Journal sought a declaration that
s. 30 of the Judicature Act contravened ss. 2(b) and 15 of the Charter.
Both the Court of Queen's Bench and the Court of Appeal dismissed the
application on the ground that s. 30 constituted a reasonable limit to
s. 2(b) under s. 1 of the Charter and that s. 15 was not violated. The
Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 30 violated
s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not a reasonable limit under s. 1 of the
Charter.
Throughout the Court's decision, there are many instances where the
importance of having access to the courts is stressed. For example, Cory
J. opined:
[M]embers of the public have a right to information pertaining to public
institutions and particularly the courts. Here the press plays a fundamen-
tally important role.... It is only through the press that most individuals
can really learn of what is transpiring in the courts.... Practically
speaking, this information can only be obtained from newspapers or other
media."
He also wrote:
It is difficult to imagine a guaranteed right more important to a democratic
society than freedom of expression.... The vital importance of the
concept cannot be overemphasized.26
While this case did not deal with cameras in the courtroom, the underlying
message of Cory J.'s opinion is that access to the courts for the media is
of fundamental importance to freedom of expression. This sentiment
should apply to the electronic as well as the print media.
Closely analogous to the cameras in the courtroom question is that of
cameras in the legislatures. The Supreme Court considered this issue in
New Brunswick Broadcasting v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of
Assembly). 7 An action was brought by a local television station against
the Speaker of the House of Assembly in Nova Scotia, arguing that s. 2(b)
of the Charter guaranteed it the right to film the proceedings of the House.
The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the Charter did not apply to
members of the House when exercising their inherent privileges, since
such privileges enjoy constitutional status. Consequently, the decision
does not specifically address the issue of a constitutional right of access
to legislative proceedings. However, the Court manages again, as in
Committee for the Commonwealth, to take several different approaches
25. Supra note 23 at 1339-40.
26. Ibid. at 1336.
27. [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319; rev'g (1991), 80 D.L.R. (4th) 11 (N.S.S.C.,A.D.).
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in discussing access as part of s. 2(b). McLachlin J., in addressing the
issue of privilege, offered these thoughts:
In Canada, this court has ruled that legislative assemblies are not open to
the public as of right: see Payson v. Hubert (1904), 34 S.C.R. 400....
However... in the Canadian context of 1992, is the right to exclude
strangers necessary to the functioning of our legislative bodies?
In my view, this privilege is as necessary to modem Canadian democ-
racy as it has been to democracies here and elsewhere in past centuries ....
[T]he Assembly must have the right, if it is to function effectively, to
exclude strangers.28
McLachlin J.'s opinion concludes that the Legislative Assembly of Nova
Scotia possesses an inherent constitutional right to exclude strangers
from its chamber. One might question whether the press should be
considered a "stranger" to a legislative chamber but the Court seemed
unconcerned on this point.
Justice Sopinka disposed of the appeal on different grounds, holding
that the Charter applied to members of the House of Assembly and that
refusing media access to the public gallery contravened s. 2(b) of the
Charter. However, he held that such a restriction was a reasonable limit
under s. 1. It was justified primarily on the existence of the electronic
Hansard which focused only on members speaking. That is, given the
importance of decorum in the House, the prohibition of individual hand-
held cameras was not out of proportion to the decorum objective.2 9 In
dissent Cory J. stated:
Informed public opinion is the essential bedrock of a successful demo-
cratic government. Accurate information can only be obtained by the
public through the work of a responsible press which must today include
television coverage. 30 ...
In my view, the protection of news gathering does not constitute a
preferential treatment of an elite or entrenched group, the media, rather it
constitutes an ancillary right, essential for the meaningful exercise of the
Charter." ...
So long as the camera is neither too pervasive nor too obtrusive, there
can be no good reason for excluding it.32
Adopting either Cory J.'s or Sopinka J.' s reasoning in this case, we are
left with the inclusion of media access as essential to a meaningful s. 2(b)
right. The courts will require a good reason to successfully exclude the
electronic media.
28. Ibid. at 386-87.
29. Ibid. at 397.
30. Ibid. at 403.
31. Ibid. at 406.
32. Ibid. at 409.
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Cameras in the courtroom are grudgingly being legally recognized as
a means to realizing s. 2(b) rights.33 There seems, however, to be a split
among the judiciary in the cases above when it came to balancing other
rights against freedom of expression (which will necessarily impact on
the freedom accorded to the electronic media). This debate regarding s. 1
re-emerged in the Supreme Court when considering the rules regarding
general publication bans in Dagenais v. CBC.3 4
3. Fair Trials, s. 1 Balancing and Freedom of Expression.
Encouragingly for those regarding freedom of expression as being as
fundamental to Canadian society as the right to a fair trial, and as not
necessarily in conflict with that right, the majority in Dagenais held that
these rights must be balanced under s. I in a more sophisticated way than
had previously been done. The Supreme Court also concluded that the
right to a fair trial did not automatically trump rights to freedom of
expression. Although there were strong dissents to the majority decision,
the majority was unified in its analytical approach to s. 2(b) in a way that
has not been present in other cases deciding media/courtroom issues. The
opinion of Lamer C.J. was supported by Sopinka, Cory, Iacobucci and
Major JJ.
In Dagenais, this majority modified the appropriate test for publica-
tion bans. Lamer C.J. stated:
I am... of the view that it is necessary to reformulate the common law rule
governing the issuance of publication bans in a manner that reflects the
principles of the Charter. Given that publication bans, by their very
definition, curtail the freedom of expression of third parties, I believe that
the common law rule must be adapted so as to require a consideration both
of the objectives of a publication ban, and the proportionality of the ban to
its effect on protected Charter rights. The modified rule may be stated as
follows:
33. Unfortunately, there has been no definitive statement from the Supreme Court on
courtroom access, even for ordinary members of the public, let alone for electronic media
reporters and their equipment. (See discussion in M.D. Lepofsky, "Open Justice 1990" in D.
Schneiderman, ed., Freedom of Expression and the Charter (Carswell, 1991) at 15-21.
Lepofsky, supra note 21 also features an appraisal of the American experience with camaras
in courtrooms that differs from the one I present here.) However, given that a meaningful right
to freedom of the press has been held to include the right to gather and broadcast events as they
unfold, I would suggest that finding s. 2(b) protection is not an onerous conceptual leap. Rather,
given the appreciation of s. 2(b) rights in Supreme Court decisions such as Dagenais (discussed
below at note 34) and Edmonton Journal, combined with the govemment-access framework
set out in The Committee for the Commonwealth, cameras in the courtroom should not be
difficult to explicitly include as part of meaningful freedom of the press, when the issue comes
before the Supreme Court.
34. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835.
152 The Dalhousie Law Journal
A publication ban should only be ordered when:
(a) Such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk
to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative
measures will not prevent the risk; and
(b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious
effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban.35
This modified test reflects three important analytical changes in the
approach to balancing freedom of expression with other Charter rights,
such as those found in s. 11 (d).
First, it is the first time the court explicitly accords equal status to
ss. 2(b) and 11 (d). Lamer C.J. writes:
The pre-Charter common law rule governing publication bans empha-
sized the right to a fair trial over the free expression interests of those
affected by the ban. In my view, the balance this rule strikes is inconsistent
with the principles of the Charter, and in particular the equal status given
by the Charter to ss. 2(b) and 11 (d). It would be inappropriate for the
courts to continue to apply a common law rule that automatically favoured
the rights protected by s. 11 (d) over those protected by s. 2(b). A hierar-
chical approach to rights, which places some over others, must be avoided,
both when interpreting the Charter and when developing the common law.
When the protected rights of two individuals come into conflict, as can
occur in the case of publication bans, Charter principles require a balance
to be achieved that fully respects the importance of both sets of rights.36
The affirmation of a lack of hierarchy is a significant development in the
balancing of potentially competing Charter rights. It is also a particularly
significant holding if applied in cases of electronic broadcasts of court-
room events. This is because of the past ease with which s. 1 justifications
for restrictions have been found when fair trial rights are even specula-
tively affected by the electronic media's freedom of expression rights.
Such easy restrictions can no longer be the norm.
Further increasing the weight of freedom of expression rights in the
s. 1 balance will be the additional proportionality test requirements
clarified in Dagenais. These new requirements were developed in the
context of the reformulated test for the issuance of publication bans. The
new test affirms a refinement of the proportionality test to be used in
satisfying s. 1 requirements:
While the third step of the Oakes proportionality test has often been
expressed in terms of the proportionality of the objective to the deleterious
effects, this Court has recognized that in appropriate cases it is necessary
to measure the actual salutary effects of the impugned legislation, rather
than merely considering the proportionality of the objective itself....
35. Ibid. at 878 [emphasis in original].
36. Ibid. at 877.
Framing the Issues for Cameras in the Courtrooms
In my view, characterizing the third part of the second branch of the
Oakes test as being concerned solely with the balance between the
objective and the deleterious effects of a measure rests on too narrow a
conception of proportionality. I believe that even if an objective is of
sufficient importance, the first two elements of the proportionality test are
satisfied and the deleterious effects are proportional to the objectives, it is
still possible that, because of a lack of proportionality between the
deleterious effects and the salutary effects, a measure will not be reason-
able and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. I would
therefore rephrase the third part of the Oakes test as follows: there must be
a proportionality between the deleterious effects of the measures which are
responsible for limiting the rights and freedoms in question and the
objective, and there must be a proportionality between the deleterious and
salutary effects of the measures.
A similar view of proportionality must inform the common law rule
governing the publication bans.... This suggests that when a ban has a
serious deleterious effect on freedom of expression and has few salutary
effects on the fairness of a trial the ban will not be authorized at common
law.
37
Thirdly, the Dagenais majority rejects the "clash model" applied to
freedom of expression and the fair trial process. Rather, the Court sees
these rights as interwoven in a more complex way in Canadian society.
Both restriction and openness are described in Dagenais as potentially
having both negative and positive effects on trial fairness. This approach,
arguably, will prove of benefit to the courtroom-related rights of the
electronic media. Heretofore courts have tended to conform to the clash
model to the detriment of freedom of expression and have been readily
accepting of negative speculation regarding the presence of cameras and
their impact on a fair trial. This has led to an easy use of s. 1 to justify
restricting camera access.
It is extremely significant that the Supreme Court of Canada in
Dagenais rejects the "clash of values model" in which it is assumed that
freedom of the press, in the form of camera access to the courtrooms, will
interfere with the fairness of the trial process. This past approach has
encouraged a confrontation between the electronic media and judicial
officials, rather than an attempt to collaborate on creating a fair but open
judicial process.38
37. Ibid. at 888-89 [emphasis in original].
38. W. MacKay, "Courts, Cameras and Fair Trials: Confrontation or Collaboration" (1985)
8 Prov. Judges J. 7. This is a position that I advanced in the foregoing article on this topic and
I am delighted that the Supreme Court of Canada has added its weight to my academic musings.
Needless to say, the Supreme Court adopted this position in Dagenais not because I advanced
it in some obscure article, but because it thought that the analysis was solid.
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What impact will Dagenais have on restrictions on electronic media as
opposed to blanket publication bans? I would suggest that the strong
affirmation in Dagenais of the significance of s. 2(b) rights for Canadian
society should mean that whenever a decision has to be made about
barring camera access, a s. I balancing is in order. The new, more
sophisticated test for the issuance of a publication ban is the appropriate
mechanism to evaluate electronic media presence in courtrooms, which
after all, is just another form of publication.
The first judicial consideration of courtroom camera access subse-
quent to Dagenais sends some mixed messages about the appropriate
conceptual framework for making decisions regarding electronic access.
In R. v. MacDonnell,39 Bateman J.A. of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
made the first decision on camera access, in the face of objection by an
accused, under that court's "cameras in the courtroom" pilot project. It is
encouraging that camera access is ultimately allowed by Bateman J.A.'s
order. The existence of the pilot project at all is encouraging as it is an
important groundbreaker. 40 However, the decision, while using Dagenais
as a general reference point, never explicitly treats camera access as a
s. 2(b) issue. Instead of relying on a s. I balancing, the decision resorts to
the administrative guidelines set out under the pilot project. This puts the
decision much more in the "shall we or shall we not" realm of judicially-
granted privilege, rather than squarely in the area of rights balancing.4 t
In MacDonnell, a television station applied under the pilot project for
an order permitting coverage of a Crown appeal of a stay of proceedings
39. (1996), 147 N.S.R. (2d) 302 (C.A.) [hereinafter MacDonnell].
40. The Chief Justice of Nova Scotia, Lorne Clarke, has remarked: "I got the impression
generally speaking that people are genuinely interested in knqwing how the process operates
[but] it's not possible for people to attend courts as observers because of work commitments
and family responsibilities." (quoted by N. Cunningham, in "Lights, Camera, Action" (1995)
11 Justice Rep. 18. The Court of Appeal deserves praise for recognizing this situation and
attempting to address it by opening access to the media establishments most accessible to the
majority of people: television news broadcasters.
It is widely recognized that appellate proceedings may be acceptably filmed. This was the
clear conclusion of the C.B.A. Special Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom. Seemingly,
the higher the level of court the less resistance there is to actually being filmed. The Supreme
Court of Canada is the most notable example of permitting cameras into the courtroom. A pilot
project is currently under way, through which media outlets can apply to the Court for
permission to broadcast its proceedings. The Court reviews the content of the case and consults
the parties to the action. This has resulted in the televising of a number of high profile cases
on the Parliamentary channel.
41. Indeed, the current policy of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court is that cameras are not
allowed in courtrooms with the exception of those media establishments which have the
approval of the presiding judge to film appeal court proceedings under the pilot project's
application procedure. This policy implies that camera access is not a s. 2(b) right at all, but
merely a privilege granted by particular judges in their courtrooms.
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in a case concerning the death of a young boy. The accused filed a notice
of objection, as provided for by the pilot project's guidelines. The
objection was largely based on the potential prejudice resulting from the
contamination of a large pool ofjurors by television coverage (as was the
issue in Dagenais).
In granting the order permitting coverage, Bateman J.A. relied on Pilot
Project Rule and Guideline 9:
9. Television and other media coverage of proceedings of the Court of
Appeal shall be deemed to be in the public interest. It shall be grounds for
refusal of an order permitting coverage if the prejudice, disadvantage,
hardship, or other valid reason apprehended by a party resulting from
coverage of the appeal or application outweighs the interest of the public
in the granting of the order, or if media coverage of the proceedings to
which the application applies is shown not to be in the public interest.
After a consideration of Dagenais, Bateman J.A. states:
The onus is on the party opposed to the proceeding to satisfy me that the
coverage sought is not in the public interest, or, that the "prejudice,
disadvantage, hardship, or other valid reason apprehended by a party
resulting from coverage of the appeal or application outweighs the interest
of the public in the granting of the order".42
Basing such a decision on a deemed "public interest" in television
coverage is a step forward, but it is not the same as recognizing television
newsgathering and broadcasting as an essential part of s. 2(b). Further,
the definition of "public interest" is not clear: which public, and what
types of interests are of concern here?
Despite some problems, Bateman J.A. makes other statements which
are promising for their tendency to place television bans in the same
category as general publication bans:
There has been no request, here, for a general publication ban. This
proceeding will be open to the public. The question before me is whether
additional publicity created by television broadcast of all or part of this
appeal will occasion prejudice, disadvantage, or hardship which out-
weighs the public interest. 43
[T]here is a possibility that the Court of Appeal will order a new trial. The
appeal proceedings are, nevertheless, open to the general public. Absent
a ban on publication, particulars of the evidence at the first trial may be
published. If a new trial is ordered the accused is in a similar position to
Ms. MacDonnell. Counsel for Ms. MacDonnell submits that the distin-
guishing feature, here, is the interest that this case may generate. However,
any appeal gauged to be of interest to the public will attract publicity. This
42. Supra note 39 at 307.
43. Ibid. [emphasis in original].
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pilot project simply provides for an additional form of publication. To
routinely deny television coverage in such cases would seriously under-
mine the premise of this project.'
In the second decision arising out of Nova Scotia's pilot project,
Bateman J.A. refused to allow television coverage in the courtroom. The
issue in Ryan v. Skoke45 involved an appeal from an order mandating an
unwed father's access to his child. The appellants included the custodial
grandmother, Member of Parliament Roseanne Skoke, who has attracted
national attention for her opposition to the rights of gay men and lesbians
in the name of "family values." The media were keenly interested in any
airing of her personal family activities. The Canadian Broadcasting
Company sought authority to broadcast Ms. Skoke's appeal from the
child access order, which promised to be particularly interesting as she
was representing herself and the other appellant, her daughter.
The appellants objected to the CBC's application, while the respon-
dents took no position. The appellants based their objection largely on the
overriding consideration in all family law proceedings that the best
interests of any child involved are paramount. They argued that the
broadcast of the facts of this case would indeed not be in this child's best
interests. They connected this argument to Pilot Project Rule and Guide-
line 9, whereby the presiding justice may deny television access where
there is "prejudice, disadvantage" and "unnecessary hardship" caused.
Counsel for the CBC cited the following passage from the Supreme
Court of Canada's decision in A.G.N.S. v. McIntyre, in support of their
application for coverage:
Many times it has been urged that the "privacy" of litigants requires that
the public be excluded from court proceedings. It is now well established,
however, that covertness is the exception and openness the rule. Public
confidence in the integrity of the court system and understanding of the
administration of justice are thereby fostered. As a general rule the
sensibilities of individuals involved are no basis for exclusion of the public
from judicial proceedings.'
Again, as in MacDonnell, Bateman J.A. bases her decision on the
guidelines of the pilot project itself and avoids any detailed balancing of
rights using s. 1 of the Charter. She points to the history and nature of
family court proceedings in support of the limitation of publicity in the
interests of the children involved. In holding against the CBC's applica-
tion Bateman J.A. states:
44. Ibid. at 305 [emphasis in original].
45. (1996), 148 N.S.R. (2d) 222 (C.A.) [hereinafter Skoke].
46. A.G.N.S. v. Mclntyre (1982), 49 N.S.R. (2d) 609 (S.C.C.) at 618.
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It is essential, for the sake of the child, that there has been an opportunity
to interact without unnecessary intrusion into their personal affairs. I agree
with the submission of the appellant that the prospect of television
broadcast of the appeal proceeding can only add stress to an already
strained relationship. To create additional stress for the parents and
grandparents cannot impact positively on the child. In my view, it is
appropriate, in this application, to be guided by the provisions of the
Family Court Act which are directed at respecting the privacy of parties.
The sound policy reasons which underpin section 10(2) and (3) of the Act
are equally applicable at all stages of the proceeding.47
This approach is in keeping with that laid down by Wilson J. in
Edmonton Journal. There, she applied a contextual approach to balanc-
ing freedom of expression rights with the public interest in protecting the
privacy of litigants in matrimonial cases. She stated:
It may be, for example, that freedom of expression has greater value in a
political context that it does in the context of disclosure of the details of a
matrimonial dispute. The contextual approach attempts to bring into sharp
relief the aspect of the right or freedom which is truly at stake in the case
as well as the relevant aspects of any values in competition with it. It seems
to be more sensitive to the reality of the dilemma posed by the particular
facts and therefore more conducive to finding a fair and just compromise
between the two competing values under s. 1.48
While I agree with Bateman J.A. that the best interests of the child in
a family law case may call for the exclusion of cameras from the
courtroom, any such conclusion should be based on a constitutional s. 1
balancing, using the approach recently approved by the Supreme Court
in Dagenais. Here, Bateman J.A. is again basing her decision on internal
administrative guidelines as if they were law. Instead of a Dagenais-type
evaluation of the salutary and negative effects of a television ban,
Bateman J.A. merely states that the "appellants have shown particular
circumstances here that outweigh the public interest",49 without listing
the circumstances or describing the public's interest.
This approach contains the implicit assumption that television bans do
not raise real freedom of expression issues. The ban is put in place as
merely part of the judge's prerogative in controlling the courtroom.
Television exclusion is treated as being so different from a general
publication ban that it does not warrant the full balancing that I argue is
necessary. Bateman J.A. rejects McIntyre as support for the CBC's
position that the appellants here were not requesting a full publication
ban. This approach is discouraging for those who would like to see
47. Supra note 45 at 227.
48. Supra note 23 at 1355-56.
49. Supra note 45 at 227.
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television access taken seriously as part of Canadians' rights under s. 2(b)
of the Charter. It is also inconsistent with Bateman J.A.'s citing of the
Dagenais publication ban framework in her previous decision under the
pilot project in MacDonnell.
Not only does the exclusive reliance on the Pilot Project Guidelines fail
to accord camera access to the courtrooms its proper constitutional status
under s. 2(b) of the Charter, it also affects the justification process. In
order to ban camera access it is only necessary for the opposing party to
successfully argue one of the restrictions on access in the guidelines. This
is a much less demanding task than demonstrably justifying the reason-
ableness of the limit on camera access as part of a regular s. 1 Charter
justification. Only this latter constitutional analysis gives proper recog-
nition to limits being placed on a fundamental constitutional value, rather
than a privilege to be granted or denied by the presiding judge.
The result in Skoke should have been reached with more evidentiary as
well as constitutional rigour. Bateman J.A. accepts the appellants'
assertion that televised coverage of the proceedings will reach a much
wider audience than would be reached through the usual means of
publication. However, no empirical evidence is cited to support the idea
that a televised news story including images of actual proceedings will
attract a greater audience than televised coverage would otherwise, or
that it would cause more harm to the child than the reporting of the facts
by a news anchor. This is another instance of a court being willing to jump
to conclusions about television and its impact.
Perhaps what this decision really revolves around is the additional
exposure that the grandchild of a controversial MP is subject to, and the
judicial distaste for the inevitable public curiosity and media enthusiasm.
Television is usually considered by the courts to be the worst purveyor of
this kind of sensationalism. Bateman J.A. closed her judgment with the
following remarks:
There has not been a request of this Court for a publication ban. Subject to
any further order which may be made, the appeal is a public proceeding.
The applicant and appellants acknowledge that there has already been
publicity about this case. No doubt there will be more publicity. I recognize
that, even without filming, the publicity will not, by law, be limited to the
"substantive legal issues" and thus may well venture into the personal
circumstances of these families. I can only hope that the media will be
sensitive in this regard and permit these parties some privacy and dignity,
in the interests of this child's future. 50
50. Supra note 45 at 227-28.
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Given Bateman J.A.'s recognition of the important yet ordinary role of
television coverage in conveying news to the public, perhaps operating
within the somewhat detailed administrative structure created for the
pilot project allows her to feel she can skip a s. 1 analysis. Under the
structure of the pilot project, she was answering objections to coverage,
not a s. 2(b) Charter challenge by the media for access. The effect of the
pilot project should not be to pre-empt a proper Charter analysis.
II. The Shape of s. 1 Balancings to Come
If other courts across Canada institute similar projects, it seems inevitable
that a direct s. 2(b) Charter challenge will emerge when a future decision
under such an administrative scheme goes against a television reporter.
This will necessitate a s. 1 balancing along the lines set out in Dagenais. I
What would such an analysis look like, and how would it likely be
resolved? I would argue that, in the absence of compelling reasons for a
general publication ban, a ban exclusively on electronic media access and
publication will be unlikely to stand up to s. 1 scrutiny.
Lamer C.J. in Dagenais outlined respectively some of the potential
salutary effects of issuing or not issuing publication bans in his rejection
of the "clash model" concerning freedom of expression and trial fair-
ness.5 2 In respect to bans, the salutary effects included:
- preventing the jury from being influenced by information not
presented in evidence;
- maximizing the chances that witnesses will testify because they will
not be fearful of the consequences of publicity;
- protecting vulnerable witnesses;
- preserving the privacy of individuals involved in the criminal
process;
- saving the financial and/or emotional costs of alternatives to publi-
cation bans (for example, delaying trials, changing venues, and
challenging jurors for cause).
The salutary effects of not issuing bans included:
- maximizing the chances of individuals with relevant information
hearing about a case and coming forward with new information;
- preventing perjury by placing witnesses under public scrutiny;
51. As well, s. 146 of the Courts of Justice Act (supra note 13) restricting camera access to
courtrooms remains unchallenged, and any challenge to it or comparable legislation would
definitely necessitate a full section 1 balancing, given the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in
Squires.
52. Supra note 34 at 882-83.
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- preventing state and/or court wrongdoing by placing the criminal
justice process under public scrutiny;
- reducing crime through the public expression of disapproval for
crime; and
- promoting the public discussion of important issues. 3
How will similar lists of reasons for and against bans be applied to the
electronic media in a s. 1 Charter analysis? One must look for actual
empirical evidence regarding the ability of bans on television coverage to
exact the salutary effects posited. A useful starting point is to review the
objections to television coverage that were persuasive at the trial level in
Squires, and offer some more current empirical evidence than was
available in 1986.
In Squires, Vanek J. of the Ontario Provincial court listed the following
concerns raised by the four U.S. lawyers who were called as expert
witnesses54 to testify to the deleterious effects of television coverage.
These included the tendency of witnesses to be distracted by the camera,
to accentuate their nervousness or conversely, their posturing for the
camera, the tendency of counsel to "grandstand" to the public and to
promote themselves, additional "harrowing" of the accused, and the
tendency of judges to become distracted or play to the camera. All this
was taken to affect the jury's fact-finding ability. The jury might also be
jeopardized by contamination with exposure to television, requiring
more costly sequestrations. 55
In the ten years since Vanek J.'s decision, the amount of information
regarding the impact of cameras in the courtroom has increased greatly.
53. Lepofsky has even gone further in suggesting that open reporting of the legal process
provides an opportunity for "community catharsis", Lepofsky, supra note 33 at 12.
54. Access opponents in this case could hardly have found four lawyers with a greater interest
in seeing television coverage stopped, and whose experiences with it had a more emotional
flavour:
Joel Hirschorn, a prominent defense attorney who was on the losing side of Chandler v.
Florida, 101 S. Ct. 802 (1981), wherein the U.S. Supreme Court decided that television
coverage does not automatically prejudice an accused's interests;
Ronald Pima, the prosecuting attorney in the notorious Big Dan rape cases, discussed at
note 67 of this article;
James Shellow, another prominent criminal defense attorney, who testified on the basis
of his own negative experience as a televised witness; and
Charles Phillips, a criminal trial lawyer who testified regarding his experience as a
witness in a televised trial regarding an incident involving the shooting of two court
deputies where he was captured at gunpoint and abducted during a trial (though
presumably not by a television reporter!).
55. See list of such effects in Squires, supra note 12 at 59-60; 73-79.
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Many experimental programs have taken place in the United States, and
have been evaluated from the point of view of effects on jurors, witnesses,
lawyers and judges. In all these studies, a large majority of participant
judges, lawyers, witnesses and jurors did not report the effects feared in
Squires.56 As of 1991, only six states and the District of Columbia did not
permit any form of direct television coverage of their courts. 7
As early as 1987, the Report of the Canadian Bar Association's Special
Committee on Cameras in the Courts was able to conclude that there was
no compelling evidence that a general prohibition of cameras in the
courtrooms does anything to affect an accused's right to a fair trial.58 The
Report reaffirms that there is no doubt among lawyers that when this right
is seriously jeopardized, it is within the judge's power to exclude all
media. Furthermore, in certain circumstances the rights of complainants
or witnesses may require some limitations on freedom of expression. 59
But in a case where no special circumstances exist, or in a non-criminal
case, the report found that there is simply nothing to be gained from the
exclusion of cameras vis-6-vis fairness.
In Appendix C of the Report, "Arguments Against Cameras in the
Courtroom", objections raised are countered with arguments and evi-
dence that cameras in the courtroom, rather than jeopardizing the process,
either enhanced it or had no effect, including:
- concerning intimidation of the average witness: in a University of
Wisconsin study witnesses who were aware that they were being recorded,
recalled more specific details and fewer incorrect details than non-
televised witnesses; 6°
and
- concerning the diminishment of the pool of potential jurors: an experi-
ment at the University of Minnesota showed that a large pool of potentially
56. See Molly Treadway Johnson, (1994), Electronic Media Coverage of Courtroom
Proceedings: Effects on Witnesses and Jurors, Supplemental Report of the Federal Judicial
Centre to the Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management,
wherein results from 12 studies conducted in state courts are summarized. For witnesses,
researchers looked at such effects as distraction, nervousness, distortion or modification of
testimony, fear of harm and reluctance or unwillingness to testify with electronic media
present. For jurors, effects studied included distraction, effect on deliberations or case
outcome, making a case or witness seem "more important", and reluctance to serve with media
present. The vast majority of those surveyed reported none of these effects.
57. James. M. Linton, "Camera Access to Courtrooms: Canadian, U.S. and Australian
Experiences" (1993) 18 Cdn. J. of Communications 15 at 17.
58. Report of the Canadian Bar Association's Special Committee on Cameras in the Courts,
Final Report, July 22, 1987 at 7-8.
59. Ibid. at 9-14.
60. Ibid. at 54, citing S.E. Nevas, "The Case for Cameras in the Courtroom" (1982) 6(3) Prov.
Judges J. 5 at 6.
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unbiased jurors remained, following intense electronic and visual media
coverage of a notorious Minnesota murder trial.61
The Report of the Canadian Bar Association's Special Committee on
Cameras in the Courts was even more explicit in its support for televising
appeals. At this level there are far fewer concerns about the privacy of
witnesses and others. Indeed, it was a recommendation of the Committee
that there be immediate pilot projects at the appeal court level. This did
not happen immediately, but such projects are now in place and operating
quite successfully. The Supreme Court of Canada has been televising
appeals for many years now, and provinces such as Nova Scotia have
recently embarked on televised appeal hearings. The benefits of doing
this are elaborated in the C.B.A. Report and the disadvantages are far
fewer and less complex than in criminal trials.
Despite acceptance of television coverage at the American state court
level throughout the 1980s, the more conservative U.S. federal court
system remained a hold-out concerning television coverage until the
report of a two-year pilot project completed in 1993. It is especially
significant then, that the reports arising from that pilot project show
increased acceptance and appreciation of the benefits of television
coverage by the lawyers and judges who participated in the experiment.
That pilot project's summary of findings included:
- that, overall, attitudes of judges toward coverage were initially
neutral and became more favourable after experience with elec-
tronic media coverage under the pilot program; 62
- thatjudges and attorneys who had experience with electronic media
coverage under the program generally reported little or no effect of
camera presence on participants in the proceedings, courtroom
decorum, or the administration of justice; 63 and
- that most television broadcast footage was used to illustrate a
reporter's narration rather than to tell the story through the words and
actions of participants. 64
61. Ibid.
62. Molly Treadway Johnson, Electronic Media Coverage of Federal Civil Proceedings:
An Evaluation of the Pilot Program in Six District Courts and Two Courts ofAppeal, Report
of the Federal Judicial Centre to the Committee on Court Administration and Case Manage-
ment of the Judicial Conference of the United States (November 4, 1993) at 2.
63. Ibid. Judges were surveyed as to their opinion of the extent to which electronic media
distracted witnesses, made witnesses more nervous than they would otherwise be, signalled
to jurors that a witness or argument was particularly important, caused lawyers to be more
theatrical, caused judges to avoid unpopular decisions, and disrupted courtroom proceedings.
Lawyers were surveyed as to electronic coverage's effect on distraction of witnesses and
jurors, witnesses' nervousness, lawyers' theatricality and courtroom disruption.
64. Ibid.
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The project was restricted to civil proceedings, but many of the
concerns regarding jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and judges are essentially
the same as those concerning the provincial court in Squires. When asked
about their overall opinions of electronic media coverage of criminal
proceedings, judges indicated more favourable attitudes in their follow-
up questionnaires than in their initial questionnaires.65 Lawyers were
even more favourable in their response to the project: two thirds said they
were somewhat or greatly in favour of electronic coverage.66
In these U.S. state and federal studies the feared effects on trial fairness
simply did not materialize. In the face of the statistics produced from such
studies, it will be hard to impugn electronic coverage by introducing the
testimony of a few lawyers as "experts". It will be difficult to ban the
electronic media on the basis of trial fairness or even decorum issues
under a s. 1 Charter balancing, since the effects such bans are supposed
to protect against simply do not, as a rule, arise. Section 1 evidentiary
difficulties for those seeking to exclude cameras from courtrooms will
become even more apparent as Canadian courts conclude their own
experiments, which I expect will show similar results to those in the
United States.
The above arguments are not to suggest that there are no problems
raised by the presence of cameras in the courtrooms. There are cases in
which privacy rights67 or the rights to a fair trial might be compromised
65. Ibid. at 8. District judges moved from a median response indicating "I somewhat oppose
coverage" to a median response of "I have no opinion on coverage." Appellate judges moved
from a median response indicating "I have no opinion on coverage" to one indicating "I
somewhat favour coverage."
66. Ibid. at 10.
67. An issue of concern raised by the C.B.A. Special Committee on Cameras in the
Courtroom is how to respect the privacy of the victim and witnesses in a criminal trial (or, even,
to a lesser extent, a civil or family case). The importance of this issue was dramatized in the
Massachusetts Big Dan rape cases (Commonwealth v. Cordiero, 519 N.E. 2d 1328 (1988); and
Commonwealth v. Vieira, 519 N.E. 2d 1320 (1988)). In 1984, a woman was gang-raped on a
pool table in a bar while numerous patrons looked on. The Massachusetts District Attorney's
office brought charges against several men and proceeded to trial. The trial was televised, and
despite assurances that the victim would not be identified, her name was broadcast by a local
television station. Following completion of the trial, the victim was forced due to publicity to
relocate with her daughter to another part of the state, at the state's expense.
Privacy is a matter of serious concern as vulnerable people, such as the plaintiff in a sexual
abuse suit, should not have their privacy sacrificed on the altar of freedom of the press.
However, the protection of these people can once again be handled by a reasonable exercise
of discretion on the part of the presiding trial judge. The existing rules about the protection of
the victim in a sexual assault case must still be respected. In spite of the problems in the Big
Dan cases, the technology does allow for this kind of protection. I see no difficulty in limiting
the access of the electronic media to the courtroom in order to properly respect the privacy of
victims and witnesses who have been caught up in the judicial process through no fault of their
own. The problems are real but they can be dealt with short of a total ban of cameras from all
courtrooms.
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by the presence of electronic media. This should, however, be assessed
on an individual basis and the presiding judge must retain the discretion
to exclude the press if she feels that it is necessary in the interests of a fair
trial to do so. There has been no serious suggestion in Canada that the
electronic media should have absolute, unlimited access to the court-
room. Their rights of access would have to be executed in a way that
respects the rights of the accused and the other parties involved in the trial.
The trial judge will and should continue to have control in this respect.
III. Professional Hesitations: How Do Lawyers and
Judges See Themselves, the Judicial Process,
the Media and the Lay Public?
Given that much of the Canadian legal profession is aware of the positive
results of the U.S. experiments, why is there such tremendous hesitation
on the part of many judges and lawyers to recognize a broad right of
access to courtrooms by the electronic media? Perhaps it stems not so
much from a concern over the rights of the accused as from fear of
television's impact on the profession and the loss of control by the legal
community. The American excesses in cases such as the O.J. Simpson
murder trial are used to buttress such fears. 68
Opponents to television coverage have tended to rely on vague
objections based on "atmosphere", "dignity", fear of "distortion" and
similarly abstract concerns, which are frequently unsupported by empiri-
cal evidence .69 These concerns arise not so much out of considerations of
68. As Robert J. Lind describes in "Defender of the Faith in the Midst of the Simpson Circus"
(1995) Southwestern U. L. Rev. 1215:
Although the performance of the press has become more objectionable over the years,
the Simpson case has allowed for a culmination of all that is wrong with our modem
media .... The media has violated court orders by broadcasting confidential conversa-
tions between Mr. Simpson and his attorney, interviewing attorneys in the hallway
outside the courtroom and televising the identity of an alternate juror. In addition the
media has rushed to judgement by relying on single sources, used digitally distorted
photographs on magazine covers, compromised witnesses by paying for interviews
before they testified and hounded others.
While this style of reporting is immensely regrettable, I would argue that it reflects on media
establishments in the U.S. as a whole, and does not reflect special problems arising from the
presence of cameras in the courtroom alone. Indeed, most of the more offensive activities took
place outside the four walls of Judge Ito's courtroom, such as the hounding of one excused juror
to such an extent that she required hospitalization. At the risk of sounding naive and
chauvinistic, I would also say that the Canadian media have yet to show themselves in a similar
feeding frenzy, and are not likely to duplicate the excesses of their U.S. colleagues in the
Simpson case.
69. Some of the Ontario Court of Appeal dicta in Squires (supra note 12) are very telling in
terms of how much the courts are grasping at straws to find that "good reason" to exclude the
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freedom of expression or the rights of the accused, but from legal
professionals' reluctance to expose themselves and their working situa-
tions to the media, particularly television.
1. The Courtroom as Fiefdom, and the Protection of Dignity
The courtroom is the only place where one man's or woman's word is
literally law. That person is the judge. Judges have traditionally seen
themselves as absolute rulers in their own courtroom domain and lawyers
have tended to treat them as lords of the realm. The presence of cameras
would not challenge this control in any legal way, but there may be a
widespread fear that support for judicial control, and our judicial process
altogether, would be undermined if put on public display.
What are the direct personal results for lawyers and especially judges
of general camera presence in courtrooms at the trial level? We could see
more circumspection applied to gender-based quips and pronounce-
ments. For example, one wonders how long a judge who used the Bible
to vilify female victims of spousal abuse would last given the presence of
cameras in the courtroom. Without them, one such judge got away with
this for years in Nova Scotia.7" A judge's or lawyer's demeanour,
alertness and personality would be exposed to a much wider section of the
public than can fit in the courtroom, and because of this the presence of
cameras might have a beneficial effect on the dignity of the courtroom.
The legal profession has a tendency to see itself as the appropriate final
arbiter of dignity in the courtroom. There is a strong tradition in the
profession of keeping everything "in house": admission standards, disci-
plinary proceedings, etc. This attitude has been carried over into the
question of cameras in the courtroom. Lay members of the public,
however, are just as qualified as lawyers to appreciate and protect dignity.
Lawyers and judges should not be viewing the solution to this issue as
within their exclusive domain. The profession has been making some
efforts to be more open to public input, and allowing camera access would
facilitate this process.
electronic media. According to Houlden J. the reason why access to the courtroom is not simply
part of the residual unregulated area of freedom of expression is the creation of the "wrong
atmosphere". According to Osborne J., "merely because cameras in the courtroom have caused
no reported problems cannot, in my view, be taken to support the conclusion that no harm will
result" (at 420).
70. See A. Wayne MacKay, "Judicial Free Speech and Accountability: Should Judges Be
Seen but not Heard?" (1993) 3 Nat. J. of Const. Law 159.
166 The Dalhousie Law Journal
2. Viewing Fair Trial Rights as Pre-emptive
Despite Dagenais there will be great reluctance at the lower court levels
to stop viewing the legal constitutional rights of an accused (enshrined in
ss. 7-14 of the Charter) as automatically pre-emptive of other Charter
rights, such as freedom of expression. A good example of this attitude is
Judge Mercier's decision in Squires, quoted above. As Cory J. put it in
Edmonton Journal, also quoted above, "[i]t is difficult to imagine a
guaranteed right more important to a democratic society than freedom of
expression [and] the vital importance of the concept cannot be over-
emphasized."'7' Yet, instead of a recognition of the importance of freedom
of expression to societal fairness, the attitude usually taken amongst the
profession is to assume that publicity will endanger the right to a fair trial,
and that even the appearance of such a threat is a proper basis to exclude
not only the electronic media, but press coverage altogether.72 There is
little acknowledgement that what we are really dealing with here is the
interrelation of two types of guaranteed rights which have equal impor-
tance in a democratic society.
3. Television as the Press's Poor Cousin
The presence of cameras in the courtroom is a narrower issue than the
denial of access to the press altogether. Total bans keep television as well
as other reporters away from trials. Instead of such blanket approaches,
we need to look specifically at the circumstances in each trial and find
solutions that allow for media coverage, including television, while
preserving the other rights at stake, in keeping with the approach shown
in Dagenais.
The approach should not be different for the electronic media than for
newspapers. The repugnance with which the legal profession often treats
television has more to do with class bias against the electronic media and
those who primarily receive their information through television, than
with the actual impact of television on fairness. The character of televi-
sion is relevant in that it has more power to influence people. This power
scares the defenders of a more traditional courtroom.
There is an argument to be made that television is actually the least
distorting of the media. For example, comparing a few seconds of video
71. Supra note 23 at 1336.
72. It became evident in Ontario during the publication ban on the Homolka trial that this
approach is questionable on more than empirical grounds: the accused in another related case,
whom it ostensibly was protecting (Paul Teale/Bernardo), actually asked the court for the ban
to be lifted in the interest of a fair trial.
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broadcast during the supper hour news with screaming tabloid headlines,
there is no contest as to which is more dignified. The print media have
much more ability to interpret and editorialize than television broadcast-
ers who simply show actual images of an event and have little time for
comment. There is, of course, the process of selective editing and
sensationalizing, but that is just as much a concern with the print media.
4. Self-Confidence of the Legal Profession
Much professional hesitancy about television may come down to doubts
about legal professionals' own ability to handle it. To what extent will
lawyers' and judges' behaviour change when faced with public outrage
or lack of appreciation for the rule of law? Will all lawyers necessarily
have to become grandstanders in order to best further the interests of
clients? How much effort will lawyers have to put into becoming
telegenic? What will happen when people see the process as it is? These
are scary questions for lawyers and judges.
We should remember that these factors are already part of legal life.
The use of media and publicity is a strategic decision lawyers already
make regularly. Manipulation of the media through interviews and press
conferences, stage whispers, looks of incredulity as a witness answers,
and the lawyer's overall demeanour are already factors used to influence
juries and those attending trials.73 The C.B.A. and U.S. reports on pilot
projects show that, if anything, televised lawyers became clearer and
more straightforward in their arguments.
Our fears must be similar to those faced by legislators when confronted
by this issue. In 1991, following the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
decision,74 the House of Assembly installed cameras which televise only
the member speaking. Media outlets are permitted to access this video-
feed, although control over the cameras' operations rests with the House
of Assembly. The House of Commons also is now televised. In both these
instances, the fears of members never materialized. If anything, dignity
levels were raised and cameras have led to a more positive experience.
The legal profession can similarly rise to the challenge of a greater
exposure to the judicial process.
73. This pre-existing attitude to the manipulation of publicity on the part of some trial lawyers
may be a bigger threat to "dignity" of the legal process than the presence of cameras in a
courtroom. See discussion in Carol Gomey, "Model Rules and Litigation Journalism: Enough
or Enough is Enough?" (1995) 67(8) N.Y. St. Bar. J. 6.
74. Supra note 27.
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Conclusion
Given the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Dagenais, there is a
better climate than ever for the judicial recognition of camera access to
courtrooms as part of the media's rights under the Charter's freedom of
the press guarantee. Decisions about camera access must be given the
benefit of a full s. 1 Charter balancing, under the modified proportional-
ity test prescribed for publication bans in Dagenais. Additionally, given
the accumulating results of experiments showing few or no deleterious
effects resulting from electronic coverage, it will be increasingly difficult
to show that a ban on electronic coverage in the courtroom meets this test.
In general, the legal community has overstated the problems inherent
in allowing cameras into the courtrooms. While there are valid arguments
based upon the rights of an accused to a fair trial and the rights of other
court participants to privacy, they do not explain the high degree of
resistance that the legal community has exhibited to allowing the elec-
tronic media to invade our "dignified" judicial process.
There are a large number of unsubstantiated assumptions about the
nature of the electronic media and the "lowest common denominator"
audience to which it is assumed to appeal. There is no doubt that the
electronic media are more concerned with mass appeal than the courts
ever have been or should be. That does not mean that the two institutions
cannot work together to create a fair justice system-one that can be
viewed and understood by the general public which it is designed to serve.
There is more room for co-operation than either the legal community or
the electronic media are willing to admit.
The issue of cameras in the courtrooms offers the legal community an
opportunity to examine some of its basic assumptions about freedom of
expression, justice and what constitutes a fair judicial process. In this re-
examination the legal community should make an effort to escape some
of its conservative tendencies and keep an open mind about the role of the
electronic media in the fair dispensation of justice. It is also an opportu-
nity to redefine judicial dignity and decorum in a way that will make the
judicial process more up-to-date and accessible to the people it is
supposed to serve.
